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Disability Benefits and the ADA After
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems
JESSICA BARTH*
INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),' reviled by some and celebrated by
others, marks its tenth anniversary in the year 2000. The legislation has made its mark
in a variety ofareas, mostnotably employment, public accommodations, andbuilding
design.2 The U.S. Supreme Court has now heard a number of ADA cases3 and is
beginning to define the place of the ADA in the existing legal landscape. In a recent
case, Clevelandv. Policy Management Systems,4 the Court considered the relationship
between the employment discrimination provisions of the ADA and benefits
programs serving people with disabilities. This Note will discuss the implications of
the case for the lower courts.
Title I ofthe Americans with Disabilities Ac prohibits employment discrimination
against individuals with disabilities who can do a particular job with or without
reasonable accommodation.6 One of the most striking aspects of the first decade of
ADA litigation is how successfully employers have defended themselves against
ADA employment discrimination suits. In general, ADA plaintiffs are highly unlikely
to prevail on their ADA discrimination claims. A recent study shows that plaintiffs
lose about ninety-two percent of cases handled by the courts and about eighty-six
percent of all cases handled by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(,EEOC"). 7
One of the barriers to success for ADA employment discrimination plaintiffs is the
defensive use of the plaintiff's statements to disability benefits providers. Often, a
*J.D. Candidate, 2000, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; M.A., 1994,
University of Michigan; B.A., 1991, Indiana University. Thanks to Professor Susan Williams
for introducing me to this topic and for her thoughtful comments and suggestions. Thanks also
to my student editors, especially Erin Melnick and Stephanie Bisselberg.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12010-12213 (1994).
2. For changes effected by the ADA, see generally LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES
AND T-E LAW (2d ed. 1997).
3. The Supreme Court heard its first two ADA cases in the 1997-98 Term. See Bragdon
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206
(1998). In the 1998-99 Term it heard six. See Olmstead v. L.C., by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581
(1999); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999);
Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999); Wright v. Universal
Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
4. 526 U.S. 795.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
6. See id § 12112(a).
7. See ABA Comm'n on Mental and Physical Disability Law, Study Finds Employers Win
Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABLrrY L. REP. 403, 403 (1998).
8. See id at 405 (citing the defensive use of assertions on disability benefits forms as a
major stumbling block for plaintiffs).
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person bringing suit under the ADA has at some relevant time applied for disability
benefits. The ADA claim, which is premised upon the assertion that the plaintiff can
work, is undercut by statements in the plaintiff's disability benefits application that
the plaintiff is unable to work. The difficult question facing courts is the proper effect
of the representations in the disability benefits application on the plaintiff's ADA
claim. Should the court consider representations made in applications for disability
benefits as conclusive evidence that a plaintiff could not do her job with or without
reasonable accommodation, dooming the ADA suit as a consequence?
The Supreme Court spoke to this issue in the Cleveland case. Prior to the Court's
decision in Cleveland, some lower federal courts took the position that a plaintiffwho
represented herself as totally disabled on a benefits application would be judicially
estopped from arguing under the ADA that she was able to do a particularjob.9 Other
courts set up a presumption scheme whereby the disability benefits application
triggered a presumption that the plaintiff would be judicially estopped from
proceeding with her ADA claim.'0 Still others rejected judicial estoppel in favor of
a traditional summary judgment standard, choosing to consider statements to benefits
providers as one piece of evidence among many.I
Cleveland addressed this disagreement and provided some answers, but in general
the Clevelanddecision takes a neutral stance that allows the lower courts to continue
slowly working out their approach to ADA employment discrimination claims.
Courts will continue to face ADA claims in which the plaintiff has applied for and
received disability benefits. The main purpose of this Note is to analyze Cleveland's
meaning for the lower courts and to suggest an approach for cases involving an ADA
plaintiff who has also applied for disability benefits.
In Part 1, 1 will provide a brief overview of the applicable sections of the ADA and
pertinent disability benefits programs, as well as a short discussion of the case law
predating Cleveland. Part II discusses the Cleveland decision. Part III takes a closer
look at Cleveland's impact on the judicial estoppel doctrine and asks what general
principles the lower federal courts can derive from the decision. In Part IV, drawing
on the Cleveland decision as well as other sources, I suggest a series of questions a
court might ask when confronting a potential conflict between an ADA claim and
statements made to disability benefits providers.
I. THE PROBLEM OF INCONSISTENT REPRESENTATIONS:
STATUTORY BASIS AND PRE-CLEVELAND CASE LAW
The ADA makes scant mention of Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI"),"2
a massive federal program that provides benefits for working-age people with
disabilities. 3 The ADA and SSDI are based on fundamentally different conceptions
9. See, e.g., McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996).
10. See, e.g., Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 963 (8th Cir. 1997).
11. See, e.g., Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 383 (6th Cir. 1998).
12. See Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1003, 1031 (1998) (noting that the "interaction between the ADA and the disability benefit
programs was barely addressed at the time the ADA was enacted").
13. The Social Security Administration administers two main programs that pay benefits
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of the capacities of people with disabilities and can be reconciled only with
difficulty. 4 However, both serve the same population, and disabled individuals may
avail themselves of both. When an ADA plaintiff has also applied for and received
SSDI disability benefits, courts are faced with the task of integrating the two statutes
as best they can. In this Part, I will set out the relationship between the ADA and
disability benefits programs, then I will discuss the various approaches the courts
evolved prior to Cleveland to deal with ADA claims that were facially inconsistent
with statements made to disability benefits providers.
A. The ADA and Disability Benefits Programs
1. The ADA 5
The ADA was enacted in 1990 to counter the isolation, segregation, and
discrimination experienced by people with disabilities in the United States.' 6 The goal
of the ADA is to "assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency" for disabled individuals.' To further this end,
the ADA created a cause of action for a qualified disabled person who has been
discriminated against in the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment because
of her disability."
The public reaction to the ADA's employment discrimination provisions has been
mixed. While some polls show public support for the antidiscrimination aims of the
ADA, 9many believethe statute's employmentprovisions covertoo many people and
are overly burdensome for employers.2" Some in the business community claim that
to people with disabilities: SSDI, which covers people who have earned protection by paying
Social Security taxes, and SSI, which covers people who are 65 and older, blind, or disabled
on the basis of financial need. See SOCIAL SEcuRrrY ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY AND
SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME DISABILITY PROGRAMS: MANAGING FOR TODAY,
PLANNING FOR TOMORROW (1999). This Note will focus on the SSDI program, since that
program was designed for workers and was the program at issue in the Cleveland decision. In
1998, around 4.7 million disabled workers received disability benefits from SSDI totaling
$43.5 billion. See id. at 9 tbl.1.
14. See Diller, supra note 12, at 1006.
15. In some of the cases discussed, plaintiffs sued under the Rehabilitation Act, see, e.g.,
Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1191 (7th Cir. 1992), or state disability statutes, see, e.g.,
August v. Offices Unlimited Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 578 (lst Cir. 1992). Because these statutes,
like the ADA, require the plaintiff to prove she is a qualified individual with a disability, the
analysis under these statutes is identical to the analysis under the ADA.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1994).
17. Id. § 12101(a)(8).
18. See id. § 12112(a).
19. See Poll Update Harris: 87% Favor Americans with Disabilities Act, THE HOTLINE,
May 12, 1999, available in WL APN-HO 38 (reporting that 87% of those polled said they
favored and supported the ADA).
20. See, e.g., Editorial, Bringing Sense to the ADA, PROVIDENCE J., July 2, 1999, at B6
("[H]ow far can the definition of a disability be stretched before half the nation's population
can sue and courts, prodded by plaintiff s lawyers, use the ADA to tell employers how to run
virtually every aspect of their businesses... ?"); Thomas G. Hungar, Editorial, A Clear
2000] 1319
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the ADA actually impedes the hiring of disabled workers, because managers do not
want to run the risk of a discrimination suit should the employee not work out.2' Even
some supporters of rights for the disabled worry that an overbroad definition of
disability weakens the ADA's effectiveness.' The media frequently portray ADA
plaintiffs as opportunists who avail themselves of special perks that they do not
deserve.' Also often reported are the costs the ADA imposes on businesses.24 In a
1998 report, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights blamed "misleading and
sometimes inaccurate news coverage" for the public's "gross misunderstanding" of
the ADA.25
This public ambivalence, even hostility, to the ADA has an analogue in the courts,
where plaintiffs lose about ninety-two percent of their ADA claims.26 The ABA
Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law's study found that there are
"myriad potential pitfalls . . . that more often than not result in automatic
dismissals. '27 Journalist Marta Russell has conclued that "[i]t is clear that judges have
Sighted View of the ADA, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1999, at A22 (approving the Supreme Court's
decisions narrowing the coverage of the ADA).
21. See Roger Clegg, The Costly Compassion of the ADA, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1999,
at 100, 104 (stating that employers fear hiring a lawsuit); Anne Fisher, Readers Weigh in on
the ADA and Finding Mentors, FORTUNE, July 5, 1999, at 192 (stating that readers say that
corporations would hire more disabled people if there were no ADA).
22. See Bill Bolt, Editorial, Disabled Can Turn Court Setback into an Opportunity,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 30, 1999, at I IA (arguing that an expansive definition of
disability has weakened the ADA); Federal Enforcement of ADA Falls Short, Civil Rights
Commission Says in Report, 67 U.S.L.W. 2199 (Oct. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Federal
Enforcement ofADA Falls Short] (noting that disabled member of Civil Rights Commission
believes that expanded disability definition trivializes the goals of the ADA); Robert J.
Samuelson, Americans with Disabilities Act Shows Its Weakness, BOSTON GLOBE, July 6,
1999, at E4 ("The broader the definition of 'disabled,' the more the law becomes a tool forthe
already employed to raise their pay.").
23. See generally John Leo, Let's Lower the Bar, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 5, 1998,
at 19 (criticizing decision allowing special accommodations for learning disabled student
taking bar examination); Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down: Why Johnny Can't Read,
Write, or Sit Still, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 16 (criticizing accommodations given to
students deemed learning disabled).
24. See, e.g., Clegg, supra note 21, at 100 (detailing the costs and practical problems the
ADA imposes on businesses); Peter Coy & Gene Koretz, Dubious Aid for the Disabled: A
Promising Law May Hurt, Not Help, Bus. WK., Nov. 9, 1998, at 30 ("[T]he mandate for
'reasonable accommodation' ofdisabled employees can require costly investment in such items
as special elevators."). However, not all media coverage of the ADA is negative. See Laura
KossFeder, Spurred by the Americans with Disabilities Act, More Firms Take on Those Ready,
Willing and Able To Work, TIME, Jan. 25, 1999, at 82 (reporting ADA success stories).
25. Federal Enforcement ofADA Falls Short, supra note 22, at 2199 (quoting U.S. CIVIL
RIGHTS COMM'N, HELPING EMPLOYERS COMPLY wrrH THE ADA (1998)).
26. See ABA Comm'n on Mental and Physical Disability Law, supra note 7, at 403.
27. Id. at 405. Two of the main problem areas cited by the study are the definition of
disability and the problem of inconsistent statements. See id. Lisa Eichhom has discussed the
difficulties for plaintiffs posed by the statute's tricky definition of disability. See Lisa
Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of the
"Disability" Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405
1320 [Vol. 75:1317
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sided with businesses."28 Professor Ruth Colker found that courts in ADA cases
systematically abuse summary judgment and decline to defer to agency guidance,
resulting in pro-defendant outcomes.29
Even to make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the ADA,
a plaintiff must show (I) that she is a disabled person within the meaning of the
ADA;" (2) that 5he is a qualified individual with a disability, meaning that with or
without reasonable accommodation she is able to perform the essential functions of
the job;3' and (3) that she suffered an adverse employment decision because of her
disability.3 2
The second element--establishing that she is a qualified individual with a
disability-presents problems for the ADA plaintiff who has applied for disability
benefits. The ADA defines a qualified individual with a disability as "an individual
with a disability, who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires."33 Applications for disability benefits, however, often require an assertion of
inability to work.34 Having at one time claimed that she is unable to work-a fact the
employer is sure to bring before the court--the plaintiff will have a more difficult
time proving she was able to perform the essential functions of herjob as required to
succeed on an ADA claim.
2. Disability Benefits Programs
Typically, the application for disability benefits at issue is made to the Social
Security Administration ("SSA").3 s Under the SSDI program, disabled individuals
meeting certain requirements are entitled to monthly insurance benefits.36 The SSA
defines disability as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
(1999).
28. Marta Russell, Government Should Do More for Disabled, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 7,
1999, at AA8, available in 1999 WL 29633927.
29. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfallfor Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 101 (1999).
30. A disability underthe ADA is"aphysical ormental impairment that substantially limits
the major life activities of [an] individual... a record of such an impairment; or... being
regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1994).
31. See id. § 12111(8).
32. Seeid. § 12112(a).
33. Id. § 12111(8).
34. See Wendy Wilkinson, Judicially Crafted Barriers to Bringing Suit Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 907, 915 (1997).
35. Some cases deal with representations made on applications for workers' compensation
or in workers' compensation hearings. See, e.g., Cheatwood v. Roanoke Indus., 891 F. Supp.
1528, 1534 (N.D. Ala. 1995). Others deal with applications for disability benefits from the
employer's insurer. See, e.g., D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1) (1994).
2000] 1321
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
continuous period of not less than 12 months. 37
To make a disability determination, the SSA uses a five-step process.38 The
threshold question is whether the applicant is engaged in substantial gainful activity;
if so, the applicant is not entitled to benefits.39 If the applicant is not engaged in
substantial gainful activity, the second question is whether the applicant has a severe
impairment.4" If not, benefits are denied. If the applicant's impairment is found to be
severe, the third step of the process is to check whether the applicant has a listed
disability, like epilepsy or amputation of both hands.4' People with listed disabilities
are automatically entitled to benefits.42 If the applicant's impairment is not listed, the
fourth question the SSA asks is whether the applicant can perform her past work; if
so, benefits are denied.43 The final step in the process is to ask whether the applicant
can do work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy." If not, the
applicant is entitled to benefits.
3. Relationship Between the ADA and
Social Security Disability Benefits
SSDI, enacted in 1956, is considerably older than the ADA and reflects a policy of
segregating people with disabilities from the work force.45 The ADA, on the other
hand, is designed to eliminate the barriers that keep people with disabilities from
competing on an equal basis forjobs and pursuing economic opportunities.46 At first
glance, it might seem as if the ADA and SSDI serve two different groups, the ADA
serving individuals with disabilities who can work and SSDI serving individuals with
disabilities who cannot work. Such a conclusion oversimplifies the relationship
between the two schemes.
As one commentator put it: "An SSA determination that an applicant is 'totally
disabled' does not mean that he cannot do anything. 47 First, a person receiving SSDI
benefits is permitted to attempt a trial period of work without losing benefits. 41 This
provision demonstrates that the receipt of benefits and the ability to work are not
37. Id. § 423(d)(1)(A).
38. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520 (1999).
39. See id. § 404.1520(b).
40. See id. § 404.1520(c).
41. See id. § 404.1520(d).
42. See id.
43. See id. § 404.1520(e).
44. See id. § 404.1520(f); see also id. § 404.1566.
45. See Diller, supra note 12, at 1005-06.
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(8) (1994).
47. Christene Neylon O'Brien, To Tell the Truth: Should Judicial Estoppel Preclude
Americans with Disabilities Act Complaints?, 73 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 349, 368 (1999).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 422(c) (1994). There is a definite trend toward greater work
opportunities for people receiving SSDI benefits. In late 1999, President Clinton signed H.R.
1180, the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act, which, among other
provisions, will allow people who receive federal disability benefits greater access to
rehabilitation and vocational services. See Fact Sheet: Ticket to Work and Work Incentives
ImprovementAct of1999 (last modified Dec. 1999) <http://www.ssa.gov/work/factsheet.htm>.
1322 [Vol. 75:1317
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mutually exclusive. Second, in the inquiry into whether the applicant can do her past
work, the SSA does not consider whether she could do that work if accommodations
were made.49 The ADA, of course, does take the effect of reasonable
accommodations into account," so a person the SSA determined could not return to
her past work could still be a qualified person with a disability under the ADA if
reasonable accommodations would allow her to return. Third, the SSA definition of
disability focuses not on a specific job, but on whether substantial gainful work exists
in the national economy for the applicant.5' The ADA, on the other hand, asks
whether or not a person could do a specific job with or without reasonable
accommodation. 2 As many have noted, a person for whom no substantial gainful
work existed in the national economy could still be qualified to do a particular job
with a reasonable accommodation.53 These three examples show how a person who
meets the SSA's definition of disabled and is eligible for disability benefits could still
be capable of working and therefore covered by the ADA. Thus, while the two
schemes are far from fully integrated, they can be reconciled.'
B. Pre-Cleveland Case Law
The task of reconciling the two statutes was left to the courts, who had to decide
what effect statements made to a disability benefits provider should have on a
subsequent ADA claim. In the years before Cleveland, several distinct approaches to
the problem of inconsistent statements developed. Many jurisdictions either adopted
or experimented with a harsh solution to the problem: the application of the doctrine
ofjudicial estoppel.
Judicial estoppel is a doctrine a court may invoke to prevent a party from asserting
49. See Memorandum from Daniel L. Skoler, Associate Commissioner, Social Security
Admin., to Headquarters Executive Staff et al., Social Security Admin. (June 2, 1993),
reprinted in SOCIAL SECURITY PRACTICE GUIDE app. § 15C[9], at app. 15-399, -401 (1995)
("[H]ypothetical inquiries about whether an employer would or could make accommodations
that would allow return to a prior job would not be appropriate [to an SSA disability
determination].").
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
51. See id § 423(d)(2)(A).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
53. See AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT Div., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, PUB. No. 915.0002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE EFFECT OF
REPRESENTATIONS MADE IN APPLICATIONS FOR BENEFITS ON THE DETERMINATION OF
WHETHER A PERSON IS A "QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL WITH A DISABILITY" UNDER THE
AMERICANS wrrH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, at 26 (1997); Memorandum from Daniel L.
Skoler, supra note 49, app. § 15C[9], at app. 15-399, -401; see also Swanks v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (concluding that Social
Security determination says nothing about claimant's ability to do prior job with reasonable
accommodation).
54. One suggestion for reconciling the two schemes is to understand the SSA determination
of disability as establishing a category of people who are excused from work but who are free
to exceed this expectation by entering the work force, at which point they will be protected by
the ADA. See Diller, supra note 12, at 1009.
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inconsistent positions.55 The doctrine is designed to prevent parties from making a
mockery ofjustice by changing positions as it suits their needs.56 It prevents a party
from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that contradicts a position taken in an
earlier legal proceeding.57 Judicial estoppel is not to be confused with other estoppel
doctrines, such as equitable estoppel, issue preclusion, and claim preclusion.58 Neither
state nor federal courts have uniformly adopted the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel,59 and
various jurisdictions disagree as to the exact requirements of the doctrine.' The most
frequently stated reason for the application ofjudicial estoppel is preventing parties
from "playing fast and loose" with the courts.6' Other policy rationales for the
doctrine are upholding the sanctity of the oath under which the prior assertion was
made and protecting the integrity of the judicial process.62
The application of judicial estoppel to ADA claims further manifests judicial
hostility to the ADA.63 When it operated in the ADA context, judicial estoppel served
as a complete bar to the plaintiff's presenting evidence to show that she was a
qualified individual with a disability.' The application of the doctrine was often
accompanied by harsh language for the plaintiff.65 As one court said concerning
statements it found to be inconsistent: "[p]laintiff... cannot speak out of both sides
of her mouth with equal vigor and credibility before this court."" Another court
concluded that, "[h]aving collected substantial benefits, based on these unambiguous
and seemingly informed representations, plaintiff is estopped from now claiming that
she couldperform the essential functions of her position."'67 Many of the judges in the
cases that applied judicial estoppel seemed angry that a person who was claiming to
be able to work would accept disability benefits. The Second Circuit, applying
judicial estoppel to an age discrimination claim, said, "to rule otherwise might leave
the implication that someone who feels himself in need of further income is free to
55. See Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1996)
("Because [judicial estoppel] is intended to protect the dignity of the judicial process, it is an
equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.").
56. See Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1217 (11 th Cir. 1997).
57. See Rand G. Boyers, Comment, Precluding Inconsistent Statements: The Doctrine of
Judicial Estoppel, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1244, 1244 (1986).
58. See Douglas W. Henkin, Comment, Judicial Estoppel-Beating Shields into Swords
and BackAgain, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1711,1717 (1991).
59.See id. at 1711; see also Michael D. Moberly, Playing "Fast andLoose" or Just Fast?:
A Look at Judicial Estoppel in the Ninth Circuit, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 171, 174 (1998).
60. For a discussion of the currently prevalent versions of the doctrine, see David S. Coale,
A New Framework for Judicial Estoppel, 18 REv. LrIG. 1, 2-6 (1999).
61. See Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir.
1996); Henkin, supra note 58, at 1725.
62. See Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1997); Boyers, supra note
57, at 1250-51.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
64. See Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 547, 555 (D. Kan. 1995).
65. See Jeffrey Koziar, Note, Judicial Estoppel and the Americans with Disabilities Act:
Should the Courts Defer to the EEOC?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2259,2275 (1998) ("Some courts
invoking a per se approach all but accuse the plaintiff of attempting to commit fraud.").
66. Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
67. Garcia-Paz, 873 F. Supp. at 555 (emphasis in original).
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misrepresent important information to the Social Security Administration."6B One
observer noted that courts applying judicial estoppel to bar ADA claims often did so
even if the formal elements ofjudicial estoppel were not present, instead basing the
application ofjudicial estoppel on the court's sense that the plaintiff was trying to
gain an unfair advantage.69
The trend toward the use ofjudicial estoppel to block ADA claims reached its high
point in a Third Circuit decision, McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc.7" In McNemar, an
employee with AIDS applied for SSDI and state disability benefits soon after he was
fired from his job.7 In those applications, he noted that he had been unable to work
since a date several weeks before he was fired.72 In affirming the district court's grant
of summary judgment for the employer, the court looked mainly at statements made
by the plaintiff and his doctors in support of the plaintiffs disability benefit
applications.73 In effect, the court took the plaintiff's word that he was unable to work
and refused to allow him to explain those statements for the purposes of his ADA
claim.74 Judging from the opinion, the court believed the plaintiff lied on his benefits
applications and took away his ADA claim as a form of punishment for that
transgression. 5
68. Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1997).
69. See Maureen C. Weston, The RoadBest Traveled: Removing JudicialRoadblocks That
Prevent Workers from Obtaining Both Disability Benefits and ADA Civil Rights Protection,
26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 377,425 (1997). For example, the court in McNemarv. Disney Store, Inc.
was not concerned with setting out the elements ofjudicial estoppel and dispassionately seeing
if they were fulfilled. 91 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1997). In fact, the court stated the elements of
judicial estoppel in its jurisdiction only to dismiss them. See id. ("[T]he application ofjudicial
estoppel is not limited in the formulaic manner urged by Appellant .... "). All the court really
required before applying estoppel was (1) a statement inconsistent with the party's present
position and (2) evidence that one or both of those statements was in bad faith. See id. at 618.
Since the McNemar court apparently derived its evidence of bad faith from the inconsistent
statements themselves, the two requirements forthe application ofestoppel collapsed into one:
a set of inconsistent statements. See also Cheatwood v. Roanoke Indus., 891 F. Supp. 1528,
1538 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (applying estoppel without listing any particular elements, on the theory
that plaintiff was bound by his prior statement that he could not work); Garcia-Paz, 873 F.
Supp. at 555 (applying estoppel without listing any particular elements, on the theory that the
plaintiff had received substantial benefits based on her representations that she could not
work). However, even before the widespread rejection ofjudicial estoppel, some courts were
more strict in their application of the elements of the estoppel doctrine. See Smith v.
Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1138, 1141 (N.D. I11. 1994) (denying summary
judgment were genuine issue of material fact existed as to one of the elements of the estoppel
doctrine).
70.91 F.3d 610.
71. See id. at 615.
72. See id
73. See id at 618-19.
74. See id
75. "The fact that the choice between obtaining federal or state disability benefits and suing
under the ADA is difficult does not entitle one to make false representations with
impunity .... Nothing grants a person the authority to flout the exalted status that the law
accords statements made under oath on penalty of perjury." Id. at 620.
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Following McNemar, a backlash against judicial estoppel began, a reaction to the
inequity of forcing a potential ADA plaintiff into the "untenable position" of
choosing between her ADA claim and disability benefits.76 Scholarly articles
criticized the application of the estoppel theory," and the EEOC issued an
enforcement guidance explaining why the receipt of disability benefits should not
judicially estop a plaintiff's ADA claim.78
The impact of the enforcement guidance was soon felt. In Swanks v. Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, the first circuit court case decided on the
judicial estoppel question after the enforcement guidance appeared, the D.C. Circuit
quoted from the enforcement guidance and reversed summary judgment for an
employer on the grounds that the receipt of Social Security disability benefits did not
76. Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
("Defendant's position would place plaintiff in the untenable position of choosing between his
right to seek disability benefits and his right to seek redress for an alleged violation of the
ADA.").
77. An early student note was particularly influential. See Anne E. Beaumont, Note, This
Estoppel Has Got To Stop: Judicial Estoppel and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 71
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1529, 1559-60 (1996). Beaumont's note was cited with approval in an
influential district court case, Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 277, 282
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), as well as in Sumner v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1567, 1576
(M.D. Ala. 1997). Articles criticizing the use ofjudicial estoppel include O'Brien, surpa note
47, at 368 (concluding that judicial estoppel should not preclude ADA complaints); Weston,
supra note 69, at 444 (calling judicial estoppel an unnecessarily harsh penalty); Wilkinson,
supra note 34, at 937 (arguing that allowing judicial estoppel of ADA claims will impede the
implementation of the ADA); Koziar, supra note 65, at 2294 (concluding that courts are wrong
to use judicial estoppel as an absolute bar to ADA claims); Andrea Christensen Luby, Note,
Estopping Enforcement ofthe Americans with Disabilities Act, 13 J.L. & POL. 415,451 (1997)
(stating that policy reasons should block the use of estoppel even where the plaintiff has
contradicted earlier statements); Mamey Collins Sims, Comment, Estop It! Judicial Estoppel
and Its Use in Americans with Disabilities Act Litigation, 34 HouS. L. REv. 843, 870 (1997)
(finding judicial estoppel of ADA claims unnecessary and inappropriate).
On the other hand, some student pieces supported the application ofjudicial estoppel. See
Heather Hamilton, Comment, Judicial Estoppel, Social Security Disability Benefits and the
ADA: The Circuits Diverge, 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 127, 156 (1996) ("Application ofjudicial
estoppel is appropriate... where the individual has admitted to a total disability."); Kimberly
Jane Houghton, Commentary, Having Total Disability and Claiming It, Too: The EEOC's
Position Against the Use of Judicial Estoppel in Americans with Disabilities Act Cases May
Hurt More Than It Helps, 49 ALA. L. REV. 645, 671 (1998) ("[J]udicial estoppel... is
important to preserve the integrity of the judicial system."); Jeorge M. Leon, Note, Two Hats,
One Head: Reconciling Disability Benefits and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 1139, 1140 ("The receipt of benefits for total disability should judicially
estop ... one from pursuing an employment claim under the ADA.").
78. See AMERICANS WiTH DISABILITIES AcT DIV., supra note 53, at i. The EEOC's
enforcement guidance carefully set out the differences between the inquiry required by the
ADA and the inquiry undertaken by the SSA and other disability benefit providers. The
enforcement guidance concluded that because of these differences, the application for or
receipt of disability benefits should never be an absolute bar to a determination that a person
is a qualified individual with a disability. See id. at 3.
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preclude ADA relief.79 Subsequent cases repudiating judicial estoppel also relied on
the enforcement guidance for its explanation of how a person considered disabled by
the SSA could also be a qualified person with a disability."
By going back to district court cases refusing to apply judicial estoppel8 and
reinterpreting cases that had seemed to support it,82 the federal courts quickly
reversed the judicial estoppel trend. Less than two years after the McNemar court
claimed to be representing the majority opinion by applying judicial estoppel, the
Tenth Circuit could say that in rejecting judicial estoppel in the ADA context it was
joining the majority of circuits. 3
After this general rejection ofjudicial estoppel, the circuits took various approaches
to the problem of inconsistent statements. The Sixth and the Tenth Circuits chose to
analyze the effect of disability applications or determinations on ADA claims under
traditional summary judgment rules, the Sixth citing the insufficiency of a judicial
estoppel theory in the ADA context. The Tenth Circuit does not recognize judicial
estoppel at all."
The Fifth and the Eighth Circuits replaced judicial estoppel with a rebuttable
presumption that the plaintiff who applied for or received disability benefits should
bejudicially estopped from bringing an ADA claim."5 Using different formulations, 6
79. 116 F.3d 582, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
80. See, e.g., Johnson v. Oregon, 141 F.3d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1998); Weigel v. Target
Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 1997).
81. Such as Smith, which provided the frequently-used quote that applying judicial estoppel
would "place plaintiff in the untenable position of choosing between his right to seek disability
benefits and his right to seek redress for an alleged violation of the ADA." 859 F. Supp. at
1142. Another district court case, Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., was cited for its policy
argument that the use ofjudicial estoppel would undermine the principal purpose of the ADA:
encouraging people with disabilities to support themselves by working. 944 F. Supp. 277,284
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
82. In Grifflith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Sixth Circuit looked back atAugustv. Offices
Unlimite: Inc., 981 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1992), which had been cited by McNemar and others
to support the use ofjudicial estoppel, and noted that the court simply applied well-established
summary judgment principles. 135 F.3d 376, 382 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eleventh Circuit, in
Talavera v. School Board, reclassified Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477 (9th Cir.
1996), which McNemar cited as ajudicial estoppel case, as a case decided on its facts without
articulating any rules. 129 F.3d 1214, 1220 (11th Cir. 1997). Finally, McNemar itself was
reevaluated when the Ninth Circuit decided that McNemar did not support a per se estoppel
rule. See Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1368.
83. See Rascon v. US West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998).
84. The Sixth Circuit noted that "[a]pplying judicial estoppel under the circumstances
presented here would be inappropriate given that the truth-seeking function of the court would
be supplanted by an agency administrative decision rendered without an evidentiary hearing."
Griffith, 135 F.3d at 382. The Tenth Circuit has refused to adopt the doctrine of judicial
estoppel in any context. See Rascon, 143 F.3d at 1330; Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d
432,437-38 (10th Cir. 1956).
85. See Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 963 (8th Cir. 1997); Cleveland v. Policy
Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513,517-18 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated, 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
86. The Fifth Circuit instituted a rebuttable presumption, see Cleveland, 120 F.3d at 517,
the Eighth a strong countervailing evidence standard, see Dush, 124 F.3d at 963.
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these circuits shifted the burden to the plaintiffto produce evidence showing she was
a qualified individual. The burden-shifting approach implied that something more
was needed than a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary judgment.
Depending on how it was applied, this approach was nearly as harsh on the plaintiff
as per se judicial estoppel.8 7 The First and the Seventh Circuits took a similar route
by requiring the plaintiff to come forward with evidence showing she was a qualified
individual, but these circuits did not create any kind of special presumption for the
plaintiff to overcome."s
The D.C. Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit disavowed judicial
estoppel in general while still maintaining that, given the right set of circumstances,
an ADA plaintiff would be estopped from claiming to be a qualified individual with
a disability. 9 The Third and the Fourth Circuits, both of which had applied judicial
estoppel to ADA plaintiffs,9° did not revisit their approach after the backlash against
judicial estoppel began. The Second Circuit had never applied judicial estoppel to an
ADA claim, but it had invoked the doctrine in similar circumstances in an age
discrimination suit.9'
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland, all but three of the
circuits agreed that the application ofjudicial estoppel to ADA claims on the basis of
prior inconsistent representations was not appropriate in most circumstances. They
did not agree, however, as to the effect the prior inconsistent representations should
have on the claim. On one end of the spectrum, some courts still applied judicial
estoppel and others applied presumptions nearly as harsh in effect as judicial
87. That the burden-shifting approach encouraged a harsh application is illustrated by an
Eighth Circuit case, Moore v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 139 F.3d 1210 (8th Cir. 1998),
vacated, 526 U.S. 1142 (1999). The court granted summary judgment for the employer on the
plaintiff's ADA claim, deeming insufficiently strong to overcome the "strong countervailing
evidence" standard facts such as the employer's refusal to extend accommodations it had
extended to the plaintiff in the past, the denial of plaintiff's SSA disability application, and the
plaintiff's statements in state workers' compensation hearing that she could work within her
restrictions. Id. at 1212-13. Surely under a traditional summary judgment standard this
evidence would have been enough to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability.
88. See Soto-Ocasio v. Federal Express Corp., 150 F.3d 14, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1998); Weigel
v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1997).
89. See Fredenburg v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Health Servs., 172 F.3d 1176, 1179
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding judicial estoppel not appropriate in ADA cases unless plaintiff has
committed afraud on the court); Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1220 (1 th Cir. 1997)
(concluding that "per sejudicial estoppel is not warranted in this case," definitely leaving the
impression that judicial estoppel might be warranted in other circumstances); Swanks v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ( "For example,
ADA plaintiffs who in support of claims for disability benefits tell the Social Security
Administration they cannot perform the essential functions of ajob even with accommodation
could well be barred from asserting, for ADA purposes, that accommodation would have
allowed them to perform that same job.") (emphasis added).
90. See Cathcart v. Flagstar Corp., No. 97-1977, 1998 WL 390834, at *9 (4th Cir. June 29,
1998) (applyingjudicial estoppel, although court found elements not met); McNemar v. Disney
Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996).
91. See Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1997).
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estoppel. At the other end, courts took inconsistent prior representations as one piece
of relevant evidence among many. It was to clear up the disagreement among the
circuits that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cleveland.92
II. THE CLEVELAND DECISION
The Supreme Court's Clevelanddecision was a unanimous rejection ofthe burden-
shifting presumption approach. I will discuss briefly the lower courts' decisions in the
case before turning to the Supreme Court's decision.93
A. Facts
Carolyn Cleveland ("Cleveland") went to work for Policy Management Systems
Corporation ("Policy Management") in August 1993.9" In early 1994, Cleveland had
a stroke, which inhibited her language ability, memory, and concentration.95 Three
weeks after her stroke, with her daughter's help, Cleveland applied for disability
benefits, stating that she was "unable to work."96 In a few months, Cleveland had
improved enough to return to work.97 She informed SSA that she was working, and
her application was denied on that basis. 98 During the time she was working,
Cleveland asked for several accommodations to help her do her job, all of which
Policy Management denied.99 Policy Management fired Cleveland for poor job
performance three months after her return." Cleveland subsequently asked SSA to
reconsider her disability benefits application.' In her request, she stated that Policy
Management fired her because she "could no longer do the job."' After her benefits
application was denied again, SSA held a hearing in which Cleveland asserted that
she was unable to work.0 3 Her benefits application was granted and she was awarded
benefits retroactive to the date of her stroke."' The week before the awaid came
through, Cleveland filed an ADA employment discrimination claim against Policy
92. Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 800 (1999).
93. For another account of the Cleveland decision, including lower court decisions and
positions taken by the litigants, see Richard C. Mariani & Kimberly E. Robertson,
Representations of Total Disability on Claims for Social Security Benefits: Powerful, But Not
Conclusive, Evidence That the Claimant Is Not a Qualified Individual with a Disability Under
the ADA, 29 U. MEm. L. REv. 651, 659-65 (1999).
94. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 798.
95. See id
96. Id.; Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 514 (5th Cir. 1997),
vacated, 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
97. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 798.
98. See id
99. See id at 799.
100. See Cleveland, 120 F.3d at 515.
101. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 798.





Management for firing her without "reasonably 'accommodating hei disability.""' 5
B. Lower Courts' Decisions
The district court granted summary judgment for Policy Management on the ADA
claim, reasoning that Cleveland's representations to SSAjudicially estopped her from
claiming to be a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. 6 The district
court's decision was based on a straightforward judicial estoppel theory.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit declined to adopt an automatic judicial estoppel rule,0 7
but its skepticism of the ADA claimant who has applied for disability benefits was
clear: "It is at least theoretically conceivable that under some limited and highly
unusual set of circumstances the two claims would not necessarily be mutually
exclusive... ." 1'g The Fifth Circuit instead held that the application for, or receipt of,
disability benefits created a "rebuttable presumption" that an ADA plaintiffwould be
judicially estopped from claiming to be a qualified individual."° To defeat this
presumption, the plaintiff would have to show "credible, admissible evidence" that
despite being disabled for SSDI purposes, she was still qualified to perform the
essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation."0 In
analyzing the facts of the case, the court did not consider that the plaintiff only
renewed her disability application after she was refused accommodation at her job
and subsequently fired,"' choosing to focus only on the plaintiff's representations of
disability to the SSA." 2 The court's concluding statement revealed a concern that the
courts would be unfairly taken advantage of if both claims were allowed: "To permit
Cleveland['s] . . . argument in the face of her prior, consistent, and-until
now-uncontested sworn representations to the SSA would be tantamount to
condoning her advancement of entirely inconsistent legal positions, a factual
impossibility and a legal contradiction.""' 3 The Fifth Circuit's tough, "rebuttable
presumption" standard reflected its doubt that it is really possible for a person to be
both disabled under the SSA standards and a qualified individual with a disability
under the ADA, and its underlying suspicion that ADA plaintiffs who also receive
disability benefits are trying to have it both ways.
C. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cleveland to resolve the split in the
circuits over the effect of an application for disability benefits on an ADA claim.' "'
105. Id.
106. See Cleveland, 120 F.3d at 515.
107. See id. at 517.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 518.
110. Id.
S11. See id. at 515.
112. See id. at 518.
113. Id.
114. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 800. While Cleveland dealt with the SSDI program, its analysis
also applies to applications for other types of disability benefits. See Peggy R. Mastroianni,
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Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court." 5 The Court reviewed the
Fifth Circuit's "rebuttable presumption" standard, framing the issue as "whether the
law erects a special presumption that would significantly inhibit an SSDI recipient
from simultaneously pursuing an action for disability discrimination.... 6 After
discussing the purposes of the SSA and the ADA and the possible conflicts between
the two statutes, the Court concluded that "the two claims do not inherently conflict
to the point where courts should apply a special negative presumption .... [T]here
are too many situations in which an SSDI claim and an ADA claim can comfortably
exist side by side.""..7
Supporting this conclusion, the Court noted three examples of how an SSDI claim
and an ADA claim could coexist: (1) SSA's disability determination does not take
into account the employer's duty to make reasonable accommodations, so a plaintiff
who could work if accommodated could still be eligible for SSDI benefits; (2) SSA
uses a streamlined five-step process to determine disability, and this process can
count as disabled persons who, due to individual circumstances, are able to do the
essential functions of ajob; and (3) under certain circumstances, SSA grants benefits
to individuals who are working.'"
The Court then turned to the effect of an SSDI claim on a plaintiff's ADA suit and
found that a statement asserting an inability to work would still negate an essential
element of the plaintiff's ADA claim, unless she provided a sufficient explanation for
the inconsistency."9 The Court set out the following standard:
When faced with a plaintiff's previous sworn statement asserting "total disability"
or the like, the court should require an explanation of any apparent inconsistency
with the necessary elements of an ADA claim. To defeat summaryjudgment, that
explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that,
assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff's good faith belief in, the earlier statement,
the plaintiff could nonetheless "perform the essential functions" of her job, with
or without "reasonable accommodation."'20
Instructions for Field Offices: Analyzing ADA Charges After Supreme Court Decisions
Addressing "Disabilities" and "Qualified", in 28TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYrMEfNT
LAW 313, 332 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. HO-0050, 1999).
115. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 797.
116. Id. at 797.
117. ld at 802-03.
118. See id. at 803-05.
119. See id. at 806. The Cleveland approach is very similar to the one previously taken by
the Seventh Circuit. See McCreary v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 132 F.3d 1159, 1165, 1167
(7th Cir. 1997) (vacating summary judgment for employer on employment discrimination
claim where plaintiff provided credible evidence that he could have done his job with
reasonable accommodation); Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding that when employer relies on plaintiffs assertions of total disability to argue that the
plaintiff cannot be a qualified individual under the ADA, plaintiff is free to come forward with
additional evidence showing she is qualified individual); Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190,
1196 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding SSA finding of disability not dispositive to the determination
of qualified individual status under the ADA).
120. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807.
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The Court made it clear that summary judgment for the employer is still quite
possible under this standard.12 ' The case was remanded to be decided under the new
standard.' 22
III. AN ANALYSIS OF CLEVELAND
By deciding that the problem of inconsistent statements should be resolved using
a summary judgment-like principle rather than judicial estoppel or presumptions, the
Cleveland Court adopted a case-by-case, context-sensitive approach. This approach
is consistent with that of the Court's other major ADA cases from the 1998-99
Term." In one of the three "mitigating measures" cases from that Term,' 24 for
example, the Court characterized the ADA disability determination as an
"individualized inquiry."'25 It held that the evaluation of whether a person is disabled
should be made on a case-by-case basis with reference to measures that mitigate the
individual's impairment, such as eyeglasses or high blood pressure medication.'
26
This holding represents a shift toward a more individualized approach. Individuals
with certain conditions-like epilepsy or severe hypertension-used to be assumed
to count as disabled. Now the disability determination for those individuals must be
made on a case-by-case basis with reference to whether the corrected impairment
substantially limits a major life activity.'27
This rigorous case-by-case approach, which is a prime characteristic of the current
Court's general methodology, 2 ' has a mixed impact on ADA plaintiffs. While
Clevelandimproved the odds for an ADA plaintiff who has also applied for disability
benefits, the mitigating measures decisions were seen as a major setback by disability
rights groups. 29 One commentator notes that the absence of bright line rules
concerning the ADA gives both plaintiffs and defendants the impression that the
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, PressRelease, EEOC Chairwoman
Comments on ADA Rulings by Supreme Court During Speech to Plainitffs' Bar in New
Orleans (visited Apr. 11, 2000) <http:llwww.eeoc.gov/press/7-1-99.html> (stating that the
recent decisions of the Supreme Court affirmed the EEOC's individualized approach to ADA
claims).
124. See Albertsons, Inc., v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 (1999); Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (1999); Murphy v. UPS, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2137
(1999).
125. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
126. See id. at 2143.
127. See id. at 2158 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,637
(1998) (holding that asymptomatic HIV is an impairment that substantially limits the major life
activity of reproduction and thus is a disability under the ADA).
128. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE ATA TIME: JUDIcIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
CoURT at xiii (1999) (noting that the current Supreme Court tends to decide cases on narrow
grounds, avoiding broad rulings).
129. See Marcia Coyle, ADA: Clarified or Ruined? Disabled Community Is Dismayed;
Business Gives a Sigh of Relief, NAT'L L.J., July 5, 1999, at Al; Robin Toner & Leslie
Kaufman, Ruling Upsets Advocates for the Disabled, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 1999, at A24.
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application of the ADA is arbitrary and unfair. 3 ' This perception reduces voluntary
compliance, which occurs only when actors believe that a law is fundamentally fair.131
While Cleveland itself was generally interpreted as a victory for ADA plaintiffs,132
it created a flexible rule, so its real legacy will depend on how the lower courts apply
it. However, Cleveland does set a general tone for how the lower courts should
approach inconsigtent representation cases. In this Part, I will address the question of
where Cleveland left the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and I will analyze the real
extent of the changes made by Cleveland.
A. Did Cleveland End the Use of Judicial Estoppel
Against ADA Plaintiffs?
At first glance, Cleveland would seem to end the use ofjudicial estoppel against
ADA plaintiffs. Its mild tone and sympathetic treatment of ADA plaintiffs contrast
sharply with the suspicious, hostile attitude ofthe courts applyingjudicial estoppel.,33
Upon closer inspection, however, Clevelandhedges its bets. In the second paragraph
of the opinion, in its only direct reference to judicial estoppel, the Court states,
"pursuit, and receipt, of SSDI benefits does not automatically estop the recipient from
pursuing an ADA claim."'34 This cautious tone is emblematic of the opinion, which
carefully avoids ruling out judicial estoppel completely and actually reinvigorates the
application of the doctrine in one area. In this sub-Part, I will discuss the
circumstances in which judicial estoppel of an ADA plaintiff survives Cleveland.
In any context, the application ofjudicial estoppel is "fraught with the potential for
causing litigants great hardship."' 35 The hardship arises from the fact that the
application ofjudicial estoppel frustrates a decision on the merits and conflicts with
the truth-seeking function of the courts. 3 Moreover, commentators argue that
130. See Leslie Goddard, Searching for Balance in the ADA: Recent Developments in the
LegalandPracticallssues ofReasonable Accommodation, 35 IDAHO L. REv. 227,229 (1999).
131. See id at 231. The argument against bright line rules in some contexts, as articulated
by Professor Cass Sunstein, is that narrow decisions reduce the risk of judicial error and
encourage democratic solutions to problems. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 128, at 4.
132. See Adin C. Goldberg, Supreme Court Sends Mixed Signals in ADA Employment
Cases, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., July 1999, at 13 (concluding that Clevelandbroadened
ADA protection).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 63-75.
134. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 797 (emphasis added). The ploy of reserving the possibility of
judicial estoppel echoes the approach of the D.C. Circuit. See Swanks v. Washington Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 586-87 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that receipt of disability
benefits does not bar ADA claim, but reserving possibility that specific statements could
operate as a bar).
135. Henkin, supra note 58, at 1713. Not all commentators would agree with this statement.
See Ashley S. Deeks, Comment, Raising the Cost of Lying: Rethinking Erie for Judicial
Estoppel, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 873, 874 (1997) (arguing that judicial estoppel advances
important policy goals and that a federal court sitting in diversity should apply the most
stringent version of the doctrine available); Mark J. Plumer, Note, Judicial Estoppel: The
Refurbishing of a Judicial Shield, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 409, 426-34 (1987) (rebutting
policy arguments against the use ofjudicial estoppel).
136. See Boyers, supra note 57, at 1254-55 (discussing the broadest formulation ofjudicial
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judicial estoppel is inconsistent with the spirit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(e)(2), which allows pleading of inconsistent causes of action and defenses.'3 7 The
abolition ofjudicial estoppel has been recommended,'38 and the Tenth Circuit has in
fact rejected it.'39 Thus, even aside from its use in the ADA context, judicial estoppel
is a controversial doctrine, the elements of which are in dispute and the application
of which is not universally accepted.
When courts applied judicial estoppel in the ADA employment discrimination
context, the existing problems with the doctrine were magnified. It was applied less
as a legal doctrine than as an almost visceral judicial reaction to what the court
perceived as the plaintiff's attempt at fraud. 40 Judicial estoppel stood for the idea that
the receipt of disability benefits was fundamentally incompatible with the ability to
prove status as a "qualified individual" under the ADA. 4'
The full-strength form of judicial estoppel was essentially rejected before
Cleveland,'42 for good reason. As many have noted, this form of judicial estoppel
completely ignores the difference between the ADA's "qualified individual with a
disability" and the SSA's definition of disability, and the fact that it may well be
possible to be disabled for the purposes of disability benefits and still be able to do
a particularjob with reasonable accommodation.'43 Even before the Supreme Court's
decision in Cleveland, the use ofjudicial estoppel against ADA plaintiffs had shifted
to a subtler form based on presumptions, best exemplified by the Fifth Circuit's
Cleveland decision.' The Supreme Court's Cleveland decision abolished this type
of presumption, though Clevelandrecognizes that genuinely inconsistent statements
for which the plaintiff has no explanation can put an end to a plaintiff's ADA
employment discrimination claim. 1
41
Even though Cleveland substituted a summary judgment standard for a
presumption scheme or the general use of judicial estoppel, Cleveland also
estoppel, not more limited versions); Henkin, supra note 58, at 1740.
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2); see Henkin, supra note 58, at 1736-37; Moberly, supra note
59, at 199-200.
138. See Henkin, supra note 58, at 1755. Other commentators suggest limitation of the
doctrine ofjudicial estoppel. See Boyers, supra note 57, at 1270 (suggesting across-the-board
limitation ofjudicial estoppel to cases in which the prior position was successfully litigated on
the merits or it was clear that the initial court accepted the prior position).
139. See Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 438 (10th Cir. 1956); see also Coale,
supra note 60, at 1, 10-11 (noting that the Tenth Circuit continues to follow Parkinson).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 63-75.
141. See Diller, supra note 12, at 1035.
142. See supra Part I.B.
143. See supra note 53.
144. Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated,
526 U.S. 795 (1999). The subtler form is characterized by an acknowledgment that it is
possible for the two claims to be consistent, accompanied by the articulation of a very difficult
standard for the plaintiff to meet to show that they are. For example, the Fifth Circuit's
rebuttable presumption standard, whereby a plaintiff's statement to SSA was presumed to
judicially estop her ADA claim unless she put forth credible, admissible evidence that she was
a qualified individual with a disability. See id. at 518.
145. Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999).
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resurrected at least the potential for application of a full-strength version ofjudicial
estoppel in one area. Specifically, the Court's new standard is explicitly limited to
conflicts concerning legal conclusions; it does not cover inconsistencies concerning
purely factual matters.'46 No fewer than three times in its seven-page opinion, the
Court points out that it is not addressing "directly conflicting statements about purely
factual matters."'47 The example the Court gives of a purely factual contradiction is
"I can/cannot raise my arm above my head."'48 Legal contradictions, by comparison,
concern status or legal conclusion: "I am disabled for the purposes of the Social
Security Act," or "[I am] a qualified individual with a disability."'49 The Court
abolishes presumptions with regard to the latter group of statements only. With regard
to factual contradictions, the Court leaves the law as it found it.' The law as the
Court found it, in at least some jurisdictions, includes the application of judicial
estoppel.'
The distinction the Court draws between legal and factual contradictions is
problematic. For example, the following pair of statements could be either a legal
inconsistency or a factual one: "I am able to work" and "I am unable to work."
Perhaps the legal/factual distinction represents a compromise that made the
unanimous decision possible. Whatever the reason for the loophole allowing
continued use ofjudicial estoppel, its inclusion was unfortunate. Problems with the
general application of the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel abound. ' 2 Most importantly,
the doctrine deprives the courts oftheir truth-seeking function." 3 In the ADA context,
the reinvigoration of the doctrine is particularly unwelcome since nine of the twelve
circuits had already explicitly rejected it.' 4 And because the Court did not openly
state that judicial estoppel was appropriate for factual inconsistencies, instead stating
only that it left the law as it found it,5 s confusion in the lower courts over what the
Court intended is inevitable. A district court choosing to apply estoppel would do so
at the risk of reversal, depending on how the appellate court read Cleveland. 6
Furthermore, sorting legal distinctions from factual decisions is difficult, and there
is bound to be a wide variation in how courts perform that task. This will lead to
inconsistent decisions across the circuits and unpredictability for plaintiffs. Itwas also
unnecessary for the Court to include the loophole allowing the application ofjudicial
146. See id. at 802.
147. Id; see also id. at 807.
148. Id. at 802.
149. Id
150. See id
151. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91. After the Cleveland decision, the Second
Circuit in fact applied judicial estoppel in an ADA case where it found the plaintiffs
statements to be factually contradictory. See Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190
F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1999).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 135-39.
153. See Boyers, supra note 57, at 1254-55; Henkin, supra note 58, at 1730-31.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89.
155. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802.
156. See, e.g., Norris v. Sysco Corp., 191 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1999) (interpreting




estoppel to factual inconsistencies, since after Cleveland it is still possible for ajudge
to dispose of truly inconsistent claims, whether factual or legal, at summary
judgment.'57 For all these reasons, the Court's preservation of existing law with
regard to factual inconsistencies was counterproductive and introduces unnecessary
confusion.
B. What Did Cleveland Actually Accomplish?
Aside from potentially reintroducing judicial estoppel into the analysis of ADA
claims, did Clevelandreally bring about much change for ADA plaintiffs? Before the
Supreme Court decided Cleveland, the Fifth Circuit determinedthat an ADA plaintiff
would have to explain any inconsistencies between her ADA claim and her claims for
disability benefits.'58 After the Supreme Court's decision reversing the Fifth Circuit,
ADA plaintiffs still must explain such inconsistencies." 9 Before and after the
decision, most of the questions about conflicts between the two claims arise and are
resolved at the summary judgment stage."w And it is still quite possible for a plaintiff
to lose on summary judgment because of inconsistent statements. 6' The sentiment
that Cleveland may be moot was captured in a quote from the oral arguments:
"[W]hat difference does it make to have the presumption as opposed to following the
normal rules.... Under the normal rules of summary judgment, the applicant in fact
is going to have to come up with some kind of an explanation for the statements that
the applicant made." 62
Cleveland does matter, principally because of the tone it sets. There is a significant
difference between the Fifth Circuit's grudging acknowledgment that "under some
limited and highly unusual set of circumstances the two claims would not necessarily
be mutually exclusive,"'63 and the Supreme Court's recognition that the two claims
are "often consistent,"'" and can "comfortably exist side by side."'6 The Court
157. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805-06.
158. See supra Part II.B.
159. See supra Part II.C.
160. Professor Ruth Colker found that "[tihe overwhelming trend under the ADA has been
for judges to decide most of the normative, factual issues themselves and rarely send cases to
thejury." Colker, supra note 29, at 119. For pre-Cleveland cases on the inconsistent statements
issue decided at summaryjudgment, see, forexample, Dush v. Appleton Electric Co., 124 F.3d
957 (8th Cir. 1997), and Soto-Ocasio v. Federal Express Corp., 150 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1998).
For post-Cleveland cases on the inconsistent statements issue decided at summary judgment,
see, for example, Vera v. Williams Hospitality Group, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D.P.R. 1999),
and Motley v. New Jersey State Police, 196 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 1999).
16 1. See, e.g., Motley, 196 F.3d at 162 (affirming summary judgment for employer because
plaintiff failed to reconcile inconsistent positions).
162. Oral Argument of Stephen G. Morrison on Behalf of the Respondents at 19, Cleveland
(No. 97-1008).
163. Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 517 (1997), vacated, 526
U.S. 795 (1999).
164. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 797.
165. Id. at 803.
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carefully points out that no "special negative presumption" is warranted.'6 The tone
of an opinion affects how courts apply it in the future.'67 Cleveland's reasonable tone
should moderate the harsh anti-plaintiff rhetoric that prevailed before the Supreme
Court spoke. 6 '
Still, the Clevelanddecision does not assure that an ADA plaintiff will successfully
clear the summary judgment barrier. The decision displays an "insistence [on]
explanation," as the Court puts it.' 69 While the Cleveland Court's tone is mild, the
plaintiff still absolutely must offer a sufficient explanation for the alleged
inconsistency to get past summary judgment. 7 ' In this, Cleveland illustrates one of
the prime characteristics of ADA litigation: the difficulty of constructing a case that
will survive summary judgment.' In one defense lawyer's assessment: "Cleveland
... while not as favorable to employers [as the mitigating measures cases] is not
nearly as bad as it could have been.... [T]he issue [of inconsistent positions]
is alive in most litigation, and will present obvious and juicy fodder for cross-
examination of the plaintiff at trial."''
166. IM at 802.
167. For example, after introducing a "strong countervailing evidence" standard (similar to
the Fifth Circuit's "rebuttable presumption" standard) in Dush v. Appleton Electric Co., 124
F.3d 957, 963 (8th Cir. 1997), the Eighth Circuit decided Moore v. Payless Shoe Source Inc.,
139 F.3d 1210 (8th Cir. 1998), vacated, 526 U.S. 1142 (1999), a very harsh application of the
standard in which the court granted summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff's
ADA claim. See also Downs v. Hawkeye Health Servs., Inc., 148 F.3d 948, 952 (8th Cir.
1998) (finding ADA plaintiff s evidence failed "strong countervailing evidence" standard).
168. For examples of harsh rhetoric, see supra text accompanying notes 65-75. Some post-
Cleveland cases finding that the plaintiff satisfactorily explained any apparent inconsistency
include Norris v. Sysco Corp., 191 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming district court's
denial of summaryjudgment to the employer on issue of inconsistent statements), cert. denied,
120 S. Ct. 1221 (2000); Bonano v. Reagan Equipment Co., Inc., No. Civ.A. 99-1028, 1999
WL 1072547 (E.D. La. Nov. 23, 1999) (accepting plaintiffs explanation that with reasonable
accommodations he could have worked for defendant but was still disabled for the purposes
of SSDI); and Vera v. Williams Hospitality Group, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 161, 170-71 (D.P.R.
1999) (allowing plaintiff to survive summary judgment based on his explanation for
inconsistency). But see Motley v. New Jersey State Police, 196 F.3d 160, 167 (3d Cir. 1999)
(finding plaintiffs explanation for inconsistency inadequate to survive summary judgment);
Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying judicial
estoppel based on factual inconsistency to defeat plaintiffs ADA claim).
169. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807.
170. See id
171. See supra text accompanying notes26-29. Other commentators point out that while the
law makes it difficult for plaintiffs to win ADA suits, they are still difficult, expensive, and
time consuming to defend because of the law's complexity. See Clegg, supra note 21, at 100,
103-04. As one columnist put it, "while [the ADA] was intended to help the physically
challenged get access to jobs, [it] has apparently created more work for lawyers than for
anyone else." Fisher, supra note 21, at 192.
172. Robert T. Zielinski, The Pendulum Swings: 1999 in Review-A Defense Lawyer's
Perspective, in 28THANNUAL INSTITUTEON EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 114, at 193, 199.
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IV. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Cleveland offers a flexible standard. The impact of the new standard will be
measured largely by the lower courts' definition of a sufficient explanation for an
inconsistency. 73 The Cleveland decision allows the jury to resolve the merits of the
plaintiff's ADA claim where the plaintiff has tendered an acceptable explanation for
legally (as opposed to factually) inconsistent stances.174
A recent article argues that trial courts tend to overuse summary judgment in ADA
cases by substituting their own judgment on factual questions for thejudgment of the
jury."5 This trend is noted as part of a larger pattern of pro-defendant outcomes in
ADA litigation. 76 Because employment discrimination plaintiffs are more successful
when their claims are resolved by juries than by judges,'" the circumstances under
which ADA employment discrimination claims get past summary judgment are
important. In a recent case in which the jury awarded the plaintiff damages on her
ADA claim despite evidence of an inconsistent position in a disability benefits
application, the reviewing courthypothesizedthatthe award "partly reflects thejury's
understanding about the problems and dilemmas faced by injured workers as they
confront myriads of forms, demands, concepts, and needs."'78 While it allows at least
some questions to get to the jury, the Cleveland decision leaves two vital questions
in the hands of the judge: whether the statements are factually inconsistent (in which
case summary judgment can be entered for the employer) 79 and whether the
explanation is insufficient (in which case, again, summary judgment can be entered
for the employer).'
This Part contains a framework for courts deciding which inconsistent
representation cases should survive summary judgment. The following questions
173. A recent article notes that "Cleveland provides little specific guidance as to what may
constitute a sufficient explanation." Mariani & Robertson, supra note 93, at 677.
174. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807.
175. See Colker, supra note 29, at 101.
176. See id. A study published in 1998 found that employers prevailed in 92% of the final
case decisions of ADA employment discrimination claims. See ABA Comm'n on Mental and
Physical Disability Law, supra note 7, at 403.
177. See Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and
Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1591 tbl.2 (1989) (finding a 19.2% success rate for
employment discrimination bench trials and a 42.6% success rate for employment
discrimination jury trials). Professor Michael Selmi reports that the low success rate for
employment discrimination plaintiffs in bench trials continued into the 1990s. See Michael
Selmi, The Value ofthe EEOC: Reexamining theAgency 's Role in EmploymentDiscrimination
Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 41 (1996).
178. Norris v. Sysco Corp., 191 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
1221 (2000).
179. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1999)
(affirming use of judicial estoppel where plaintiff had made factual statements in disability
benefits application that contradicted position taken in ADA claim).
180. See, e.g., Jammer v. School Dist., No. 978663CIVHURLEYLYNCH, 1999 WL
1073688, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 1999) (finding plaintiff had not put forward a sufficient
explanation for inconsistent positions and thus could not survive summary judgment).
1338 [Vol. 75:1317
DISABILITY BENEFITS AND ADA SUITS
reflect relevant distinctions that have emerged in the pre-Cleveland case law,
Clevelanditself, and cases that have been decided since Clevelandwas handed down.
When faced with a disability benefits application potentially damaging to an ADA
plaintiff, I suggest the court ask the following four questions: (1) Did the plaintiff
actually receive disability benefits? (2) Is the contradiction factual or legal? (3) Has
the plaintiff put forth an explanation for the inconsistent statements? (4) Is the
explanation sufficient for the plaintiff to survive summary judgment?
This series of questions will sort plaintiffs into four distinct categories: plaintiffs
who need not provide an explanation at all; plaintiffs who need not be given an
opportunity to explain; plaintiffs who have provided a sufficient explanation and will
survive summary judgment; and plaintiffs who have provided an insufficient
explanation and will lose on summary judgment.
A. Question 1: Did the Plaintiff Receive
Disability Benefits?
The first question is an easy yes-or-no threshold question that should relieve a
number of plaintiffs from the obligation of having to provide an explanation for
inconsistent statements at all.
Ifthe plaintiff did not receive disability benefits, but only applied for them and was
rejected or withdrew, Cleveland explicitly states that courts should disregard any
allegedly inconsistent statements made in the application,"' the rationale being that
our legal system normally tolerates the pleading of inconsistent claims or defenses.8 2
In a case decided since Cleveland, a district court in fact denied summary judgment
for the employer on the grounds that SSA had denied the plaintiff's claim.'
Before Cleveland, courts occasionally entered summary judgment for employers
based on inconsistent statements in unsuccessful disability benefits applications."8
However, a threshold requirement of having received disability benefits is consistent
with the "prior success" requirement common to many jurisdictions' versions of the
doctrine of judicial estoppel.' 5 It was also recommended by critics of the pre-
Cleveland approach to inconsistent statements.
86
181. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805 ("[I]f an individual has merely applied for, but has not been
awarded, SSDI benefits, any inconsistency in the theory of the claims is of the sort normally
tolerated by our legal system.").
182. See id
183. See Matz v. Sisters of'Providence, No. CIV. 98-1598-JO, 1999 WL 1201682, at*4 (D.
Or. Dec. 8, 1999).
184. See Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (granting
summary judgment for employer despite denial of plaintiffs application for disability
benefits).
185. See Boyers, supra note 57, at 1255-58 (advocating prior success requirement for
application ofjudicial estoppel).
186. See Weston, supra note 69, at 428-30.
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B. Question 2: Is the Contradiction
Factual or Legal?
The standard set out in Cleveland does not apply to factual inconsistencies, which
courts are to approach as they would have before the Cleveland decision. 8 7 While I
believe that for practical and policy reasons factual contradictions should be handled
under the Cleveland standard for legal contradictions,'88 the law indicates that courts
should separate the two. To adhere to the spirit of the Cleveland decision, however,
courts should interpret "factual inconsistency" as a narrow category, and count as
factual inconsistencies only statements about purely factual matters, such as whether
one is able to raise one's arm above one's head.'89 In the first post-Cleveland case to
make use of the factual/legal distinction, the Second Circuit classified the plaintiff's
statements to various benefits providers that he could not stand or walk for more than
five minutes at a time as factually inconsistent with his ADA claim that he could do
his job as a school custodian, including walking for a substantial portion of the day.'O
More difficult-to-categorize inconsistencies-such as "I am unable to work"/"I am
able to work"--should be placed in the "legal inconsistency" rubric. The
inconsistency most often encountered in the cases--"I am totally disabled"/"I am not
too disabled to work"-is Cleveland's prime example of a legal inconsistency.' 9'
Assuming a purely factual contradiction, Cleveland left each circuit's law as it
found it. That means that the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits may apply judicial
estoppel,"9 and the Fifth and Eighth may presume thatjudicial estoppel should apply,
absent a strong showing from the plaintiff that it should not.'93 The First and Seventh
Circuits applied the Cleveland standard before Cleveland did,"9 and the Sixth and
187. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802. Presumably, Cleveland doesn't require courts to allow the
plaintiff to explain if the inconsistency is purely factual because the only possible explanation
is that one of the representations is false. Of course, timing could provide a sufficient
explanation for a purely factual apparent inconsistency. However, since Cleveland does not
apply to factual inconsistencies at all, it does not apply to factual inconsistencies that could be
explained by the fact that they referred to different times.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 152-57.
189. This is the example of a purely factual matter given in Cleveland. Cleveland, 526 U.S.
at 802.
190. See Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1999).
191. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802.
192. Before Cleveland, the Second Circuit had not had the opportunity to speak directly to
the issue of whether it would apply judicial estoppel to an ADA claim, but in Simon v. Safelite
Glass Corp., it accepted ajudicial estoppel theory in an age discrimination suit. 128 F.3d 68,
73-74 (2d Cir. 1997). After Cleveland, in Mitchell, the Second Circuit applied judicial estoppel
to a factual inconsistency, with the result of barring an ADA claim. Mitchell, 190 F.3d at 6-7.
For the law in the Third Circuit, see the classic judicial estoppel case McNemar v. Disney
Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996). The Fourth Circuit applied judicial estoppel to an ADA
claim in Cathcart v. Flagstar Corp., No. 97-1977, 1998 WL 390834, *8 (4th Cir. June 29,
1998), although in that case it found the elements were not met.
193. See Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 961-63 (8th Cir. 1997); Cleveland v.
Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated, 526 U.S. 795
(1999).
194. See Soto-Ocasio v. Federal Express Corp., 150 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1998); Weigel v.
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Tenth resolved questions of inconsistent representations using ordinary summary
judgment principles,'95 so all four should approach factual inconsistencies under a
Cleveland-like summary judgment standard. The approach of the Ninth, Eleventh,
and D.C. Circuits prefigured the Cleveland loophole in that all rejected the
application ofjudicial estoppel on the facts of the case before them without finding
that judicial estoppel could never apply.'96 These three circuits might well choose to
apply judicial estoppel to factual inconsistencies.
C. Question 3: Has the Plaintiff Put Forth an Explanation
for the Inconsistent Statements?
The third question is another simple yes-or-no question. According to Cleveland,
the plaintiff absolutely must have an explanation for the inconsistency.'97 If there is
no explanation, summary judgment for the employer is appropriate. 98
A recent case raises the question of how to handle cases in which the facts were
developed before Clevelandannounced that plaintiffs should have the opportunity to
explain inconsistencies. In Motley v. New Jersey State Police, the Third Circuit
decided that the plaintiff had not met his Cleveland burden based on the record,
which had been developed before Cleveland.'99 The dissenting judge argued
strenuously that Cleveland demanded that the case be remanded to give the plaintiff
an opportunity to explain the inconsistency, rather than the court deciding for itself
from the record that the plaintiff could not explain the inconsistency."' Because pre-
Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1997).
195. See Rascon v. US West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998);
Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, 135 F.3d 376, 382 (6th Cir. 1998).
196. See Fredenburg v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Health Servs., 172 F.3d 1176, 1179
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a summary judgment approach would suffice for most cases but
that judicial estoppel could be applied if a party's position amounted to a knowing
misrepresentation or afraud on the court); Talaverav. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1220 (1 th
Cir. 1997) (concluding that "per sejudicial estoppel is not warranted in this case"); Swanks
v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reserving
possibility of barring ADA claims in other circumstances).
197. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806 ("[W]e hold that an ADA plaintiffcannot simply ignore the
apparent contradiction that arises out of the earlier SSDI total disability claim. Rather, she must
proffer a sufficient explanation.").
198. See Feldman v. American Mem'l Life Ins. Co., No. 98-1831, 1999 WL 1018083, at *8
(7th Cir. Nov. 9, 1999) (affirming grant of summary judgment to employer where plaintiff
failed to explain how claim of total disability could be reconciled with claim to be able to do
her job); Weigel, 122 F.3d at 469 (affirming grant of summary judgment for the employer
where plaintiff failed to provide additional evidence of her ability to perform her essential
duties with or without accommodation); Jammer v. School Dist., No.
978663CIVHURLEYLYNCH, 1999 WL 1073688, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 1999) (granting
summary judgment for employer where plaintiff failed to come forward with an explanation
to counter representations in disability applications).
199. No. 97-5715, 1999 WL 985135, at * 6 (3d Cir. Nov. 1, 1999).
200. See id. at *7 (Rendell, J., dissenting) ("[A]fter Cleveland, we should remand in cases
such as this to provide all plaintiffs in Mr. Motley's position with the opportunity to explain
away the inconsistency ... rather than reaching our own conclusions from the record.").
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Cleveland case law did not make it clear that a plaintiff would even have the
opportunity to explain an inconsistency, it is more fair to the plaintiff and more
consistent with Cleveland for a reviewing court to remand to allow the plaintiff to
provide an explanation.
D. Question 4: Is the Explanation Sufficient
for the Plaintiff To Survive Summary Judgment?
The heart of the Cleveland inquiry is determining whether the plaintiff's
explanation suffices to overcome a motion for summary judgment. The Cleveland
standard for defeating summary judgment states that the "explanation must be
sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that, assuming the truth of, or
the plaintiff's good faith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless
perform the essential functions of her job, with or without 'reasonable
accommodation."' 20 1
The one clearly insufficient explanation for an apparent inconsistency is the
plaintiffs disavowal of the earlier representation." 2 The Clevelandstandard requires
the court to assume that the earlier representation either was true or that the plaintiff
had a good faith belief that it was true.
20 3
In a recent case, the plaintiff stated on a disability benefits application that he was
disabled as of the day he was fired from his job and that "[n]obody in their right mind
would even think of hiring me."2" Later, he filed a malpractice claim against the
attorney who represented him in his unsuccessful attempt to be reinstated to hisjob. °5
In making the claim that he would have been successful in seeking reinstatement but
for the attorney's malpractice, the plaintiff alleged that he was able to work as of the
day he was fired.2 6 The plaintiff gave no further explanation for the contradiction
between his two statements (that he could and could not work the day he was fired).
The court held that the plaintiff's simply contradicting his earlier sworn testimony did
201. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807.
202. A comment from one of the Justices at oral argument:
I thought I heard the SG and everybody saying, yeah, we agree to that; one thing
an applicant cannot do is go in and say, wait, I am disabled, Social Security
Administration, and then later in the next suit they can't come in and say, oh, no,
no, no, what I said before was false. Everybody says they can't say that.
Transcript of Oral Argument, Cleveland (No. 97-1008), available in 1999 WL 115176, at *24
(Feb. 24, 1999).
203. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807. Whether one of the plaintiff's assertions was in bad
faith or was a knowing misrepresentation is sometimes discussed in the cases. See, e.g.,
Fredenburg v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Health Servs., 172 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir.
1999). However, looking for bad faith is not a separate step in the analysis because the concept
of"bad faith" simply represents the court's conclusion that there is not a sufficient explanation
for the inconsistency.
204. Furrow v. Corwin, No. C4-98-2126, 1999 WL 391599, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 15,
1999).
205. See id. at *2.
206. See id.
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not constitute a sufficient explanation under Cleveland."7 In sum, offering the
explanation that the earlier statement was false is the equivalent of not offering an
explanation at all, and summary judgment should be entered for the employer.208
Potentially sufficient explanations fall into two main categories. The first contains
explanations based on the plaintiff's not having claimed total disability at the time of
the employment decision. To support this, the plaintiff can point either to the fact that
the benefits application refers to a time other than the time of the employment
decision or to the fact that the specific representations made do not indicate total
disability. If the plaintiff has in fact asserted total disability at the time of the
employment decision, her explanation will necessarily have to focus on the difference
in the meanings of the term "disabled" under SSDI and the ADA. However, just
because an explanation falls into one of these potentially sufficient categories does
not mean that the plaintiff will survive summary judgment.
1. No Total Disability at Time
of Employment Decision
If the plaintiff claims that she was not totally disabled at the time of the
employment decision, her explanation will center either on timing or on the content
of her representations to the disability benefit provider.
a. Timing
The most acceptable and convincing explanation that a plaintiff can put forth is that
the benefits application does not refer to the time of the employment decision. As
Cleveland noted, "the nature of an individual's disability may change over time." 2"
Perhaps the plaintiff did not apply for benefits until well after the employment
decision, when the plaintiff's condition had worsened.210 Or perhaps the plaintiffs
condition improved after the benefits application. 21 ' As one court remarked, "[t]he
healing process is often both manifest and marvelous. '12 However, if a plaintiff has
asserted in the benefits application that she was "totally disabled" at the time of the
207. See id. at *3.
208. This outcome would be less certain if the plaintiff admitted that her earlier statement
was false, but argued that she had not understood the question or had received incorrect advice
on answering from a lawyer or an SSA employee.
209. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805; see also D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1996) (denying summary judgment for employer where plaintiff never claimed to have
been totally disabled at the time she requested the accommodation from her employer).
210. See Vera v. Williams Hospitality Group, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 161, 170-71 (D.P.R.
1999) (involving a two-year gap between employment decision and filing for SSDI).
211. The Cleveland plaintiff, for example, filed for benefits soon after her stroke, when her
recovery was uncertain. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 798. When she was able to return to work,
she told SSA and her application was denied. See id. It was only when she was fired (allegedly
after being refused reasonable accommodations) that she renewed her application and was
awarded benefits retroactively. See id. at 798-99.
212. Norris v. Sysco Corp., 191 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
1221 (2000).
13432000]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
employment decision, 23 to survive summary judgment she will have to provide an
explanation based on something other than timing, such as a failure to provide
reasonable accommodations. 2 4
b. Content of Representations
A plaintiff's explanation may concern the content of the representations made to
the benefit provider. For example, if the plaintiff merely checked a box marked
"totally disabled" as part of the application process, the plaintiff may argue that this
format did not give her the opportunity to explain the subtleties of her situation.
Benefits could be awarded under such an abbreviated process if the plaintiff is one
of those people whom SSA presumes disabled because they have a listed disability.2 5
In most cases, however, the disability determination is fairly personalized and
involves a hearing, in which case claiming that the SSA forms did not allow for full
explanation is not likely to satisfy the court.216
A plaintiff might also base her explanation on the specific representations made.
She may not have unequivocally asserted a total disability in her benefits application;
perhaps she only stated that she could work but accommodations were denied her. In
Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the plaintiff stated he was unable to work because
no employer would hire him, not because he was physically incapable. 2 7 The limited
nature of the plaintiffs admission influenced the court's decision not to grant
summary judgment to the employer.23 In Donahue v. Consolidated Rail Corp., the
court found that the plaintiff had met his Cleveland burden of reconciling his
inconsistent statements where he never represented to his benefits provider that he
could not work, but only that he could not work at his former job (his ADA claim
being that his employer should have transferred him to another position as a
reasonable accommodation). 219 In Matz v. Sisters ofProvidence in Oregon, the court
found that a plaintiffs assertion to SSA that she could work only part time was
213. This was the situation in the McNemar case; McNemar represented on his disability
benefits application that he was totally disabled five weeks before he was fired for taking
money from a cash register. McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610,615 (3d Cir. 1996).
214. See Rascon v. US West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998)
("There is nothing inconsistent in Mr. Rascon applying for disability benefits after having his
reasonable accommodation denied.").
215. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42; see also O'Brien, supra note 47, at 361
(noting that a complete application for federal disability benefits can be made over the
telephone).
216. For example, an explanation based on the limitations of the SSA's forms would not
work in a case like Mitchell v. Washingtonville Central School District, 190 F.3d I (2d Cir.
1999), where the plaintiff made statements regarding his inability to work in front of several
administrative tribunals. Id. at 7.
217. 135 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1998).
218. See id. at 384. Physicans' statements in disability benefits applications, as well as the
plaintiff's own assertions, can operate in this way. See, e.g., Rascon, 143 F.3d at 1332 (finding
no error in conclusion that plaintiff was a qualified individual where doctor testified plaintiff
could have returned to work had he not been terminated).
219. 52 F. Supp. 2d 476, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
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consistent with her ADA claim that she could do the essential functions of her job
with the accommodation of a part-time schedule."0
It will be very difficult for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment, however,
where the plaintiff has asserted a total disability in her own words, accompanied by
specific descriptions of her physical limitations." This is especially true where the
plaintiff has i'ade the representations repeatedly.'m Ifthis is the case, the plaintiffwill
need to provide an explanation based on the difference in definitions of disability.
2. Differences in the Definition
of Disability
If the plaintiff concedes that she represented herself as totally disabled at the time
of the employment decision, she can still explain the apparent inconsistency by the
fact that disability is defined differently for the purposes of receiving benefits and
qualifying for the protection of the ADA. This difference makes it possible to be
"disabled" or "unable to work" for SSDI purposes and simultaneously be a qualified
person with a disability under the ADA (meaning a person who can perform the
essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation).' The
central difference in the two definitions is that the SSA does not consider the
employer's duty to make reasonable accommodations when determining whether an
individual is able to work, while the ADA does.n 4
A plaintiff will have to do more than simply point to this difference in the
definitions to survive summary judgment. As the Third Circuit noted in Motley v.
New Jersey State Police, "simply averring that the statutory schemes differ is not
enough to survive summary judgment in light of Cleveland. An ADA plaintiff must
offer a more substantial explanation to explain the divergent positions taken, or else
summary judgment could never be granted."' In Vera v. Williams Hospitality
Group, for example, the plaintiff survived summary judgment by pointing out the
220. No. CIV. 98-1598-JO, 1999 WL 1201682, at *4 (D. Or. Dec. 8, 1999).
221. See Feldman v. American Mem'l Life Ins. Co., No. 98-1831, 1999 WL 1018083, at *7-
8 (7th Cir. Nov. 9, 1999) (affirming grant of summary judgment to employer where plaintiff
described herself as completely and totally disabled and described her physical condition in
detail, but failed to explain how these statements were consistent with her ADA claim); Motley
v. New Jersey State Police, No. 97-5715, 1999 WL 985135, at *6 (3d Cir. Nov. 1, 1999)
(affirming grant of summary judgment to employer where plaintiff gave detailed descriptions
of his incapacity to work but was not able to reconcile these statements with his ADA claim);
Jammer v. School Dist., No. 978663CIVHURLEYLYNCH, 1999 WL 1073688, at 4* (S.D.
Fla. Nov. 19, 1999) (granting summary judgment to employer where plaintiff claimed to be
permanently disabled, plaintiff's doctors said there was no accommodation that could allow
him to work, and plaintiff did not explain the inconsistency between these statements and his
ADA claim).
222. See, e.g., Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963, 967-69 (E.D.N.C.
1994) (discussing how plaintiff's "numerous" statements convinced the court that plaintiff
perceived herself to be totally disabled).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
224. See AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT DIV., supra note 53, at 160-61.
225. 1999 WL 985135, at *5.
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difference in the definitions and providing evidence that he could have done his job
with accommodation. 6
However, it is probably not enough for a plaintiff simply to state that her former
employer could have accommodated her disability.227 The Eighth Circuit would
require the plaintiff to put forward evidence that the plaintiff advised her employer
during employment of what accommodations were needed, as well as evidence that
these accommodations would have sufficed to allow her to do the job." Using a
somewhat less stringent standard, a Louisiana district court recently held that a
plaintiff had met the Cleveland burden by asserting that he could have done his job
had his employer made reasonable accommodations, such as giving him assignments
within his work restrictions and excusing him from work for medical appointments. 2 9
As these decisions show, what constitutes a sufficient explanation will vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but plaintiffs are most likely to succeed where they can
provide substantial evidence showing that their employers could have accommodated
their disabilities.
CONCLUSION
After Cleveland, an ADA plaintiff who has received disability benefits should
survive summary judgment on her ADA claim if she provides an explanation for a
legal inconsistency based on timing, content of representations, or her employer's
failure to accommodate. However, Cleveland represents a limited victory for ADA
plaintiffs for two main reasons: it leaves courts free to apply judicial estoppel to
factual inconsistencies, and it leaves the highly discretionary determination of what
explanations will meet the Cleveland standard in the hands of the lower courts, many
of which have been hostile to ADA claims in the past.
On many levels, Clevelandreflects larger trends in ADA jurisprudence. One such
trend is the difficultly of constructing a prima facie ADA claim. Cleveland eases the
plaintiff's burden somewhat by removing unfavorable presumptions, but prior
inconsistent statements can still be used as powerful evidence against the plaintiff's
claim that she is a qualified person with a disability. Cleveland also tacitly approves
the widespread practice of courts deciding ADA claims at the summary judgment
stage by leaving a great deal of discretion with the trial court to decide whether a
plaintiff has offered an explanation sufficient to allow the claim to survive summary
judgment. Third, Cleveland illustrates the Supreme Court's dedication to an
individualized approach under the ADA. Rather than creating a bright-line rule,
Cleveland sets out a highly individualized, context-sensitive test for evaluating
conflicts between a plaintiffs statements to disability benefits providers and the
226. 73 F. Supp. 2d 161, 171-71 (D.P.R. 1999).
227. See e.g., Moore v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 187 F.3d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 1999)
(finding that plaintiff's affidavit concerning reasonable accommodations her employer could
have offered did not create a genuine issue of material fact), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3366
(Dec. 6, 1999) (No. 99-6454).
228. See id.
229. See Bonano v. Reagan Equip. Co., No. Civ.A. 99-1028, 1999 WL 1072547, at *3-4
(E.D. La. Nov. 23, 1999).
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statements in the plaintiff's ADA claim. By taking this approach, Cleveland allows
continued lower-court hostility to the ADA and perpetuates unpredictability for ADA
plaintiffs. Whether the Court's aloof approach will also allow the lower courts slowly
to evolve a principled, effective methodology for dealing with the problem of
inconsistent statements remains to be seen.

